Pain-relief learning in flies, rats, and man: basic research and applied perspectives by Gerber, B. et al.
Review
Pain-relief learning in flies, rats, and man: basic research
and applied perspectives
Bertram Gerber,1,2,3,8 Ayse Yarali,4 So¨ren Diegelmann,1 Carsten T. Wotjak,5
Paul Pauli,6 and Markus Fendt2,7
1Leibniz Institut fu¨r Neurobiologie (LIN), Abteilung Genetik von Lernen und Geda¨chtnis, 39118 Magdeburg, Germany; 2Center for
Behavioral Brain Sciences (CBBS), 39016 Magdeburg, Germany; 3Otto von Guericke Universita¨t Magdeburg, Institut fu¨r Biologie,
39106 Magdeburg, Germany; 4Leibniz Institut fu¨r Neurobiologie (LIN), Forschergruppe Molekulare Systembiologie des Lernens,
39118 Magdeburg, Germany; 5Max-Planck-Institut fu¨r Psychiatrie, Abteilung fu¨r Stressneurobiologie und Neurogenetik,
Arbeitsgruppe Neuronale Plastizita¨t, 80804 Mu¨nchen, Germany; 6Universita¨t Wu¨rzburg, Institut fu¨r Psychologie, Lehrstuhl fu¨r
Biologische Psychologie, Klinische Psychologie und Psychotherapie, 97070 Wu¨rzburg, Germany; 7Otto von Guericke Universita¨t
Magdeburg, Institut fu¨r Pharmakologie und Toxikologie, 39120 Magdeburg, Germany
Memories relating to a painful, negative event are adaptive and can be stored for a lifetime to support preemptive avoid-
ance, escape, or attack behavior. However, under unfavorable circumstances such memories can become overwhelmingly
powerful. They may trigger excessively negative psychological states and uncontrollable avoidance of locations, objects, or
social interactions. It is therefore obvious that any process to counteract such effects will be of value. In this context, we
stress from a basic-research perspective that painful, negative events are “Janus-faced” in the sense that there are actually
two aspects about them that are worth remembering: What made them happen and what made them cease. We review pub-
lished findings from fruit flies, rats, and man showing that both aspects, respectively related to the onset and the offset of
the negative event, induce distinct and oppositely valenced memories: Stimuli experienced before an electric shock acquire
negative valence as they signal upcoming punishment, whereas stimuli experienced after an electric shock acquire positive
valence because of their association with the relieving cessation of pain. We discuss howmemories for such punishment- and
relief-learning are organized, how this organization fits into the threat-imminence model of defensive behavior, and what
perspectives these considerations offer for applied psychology in the context of trauma, panic, and nonsuicidal self-injury.
The acknowledged “negative” mnemonic effects of adverse ex-
periences mostly relate to what happens before the onset of
an aversive, painful event. However, there is a less widely ac-
knowledged type of memory that relates to what happens after
the offset of or after escape from such a painful event, at the
moment of “relief” (Fig. 1) (we use “relief” to refer specifically
to the acute effects of punishment offset; an equally legitimate
yet broader use of the word in, e.g., “fear relief,” encompasses
any process that eases fear [Riebe et al. 2012]). Indeed, in exper-
imental settings, it turns out that stimuli experienced before
and during a punishing episode are later avoided as they signal
upcoming punishment, whereas stimuli experienced after a
painful episode can subsequently prompt approach behavior, ar-
guably (Box 1) because of their association with the relieving
cessation of pain (Konorski 1948; Smith and Buchanan 1954;
Wolpe and Lazarus 1966; Zanna et al. 1970; Solomon and
Corbit 1974; Schull 1979; Solomon 1980; Wagner 1981;
Walasek et al. 1995; Tanimoto et al. 2004; Yarali et al. 2008,
2009b; Andreatta et al. 2010, 2012; Yarali and Gerber 2010;
Ilango et al. 2012; Navratilova et al. 2012; Diegelmann et al.
2013b); for a corresponding finding in the appetitive domain,
see Hellstern et al. (1998) and Felsenberg et al. (2013). Such re-
lief can both support the learning of the cues associated with
the disappearance of the threat and reinforce those behaviors
that helped to escape it. Obviously, the positive conditioned
valence of and ensuing learned approach behavior toward
such cues would decrease the probability of encountering the
threat again and/or keep exposure time to a minimum. We review
the literature of what is known, and discuss what should be asked,
about the mechanisms of such punishment- and relief-learning in
the fruit fly Drosophila, as well as in rat and in man, as in these
three species fairly concordant approaches have been taken.
This is timely, because despite the rich literature on punish-
ment–learning (e.g., for reviews regarding Drosophila, see:
Dubnau and Tully 2001; Heisenberg 2003; Gerber et al. 2004;
Davis 2005; Keene and Waddell 2007; Kahsai and Zars 2011; re-
garding Aplysia, see: Lechner and Byrne 1998; Baxter and Byrne
2006; Benjamin et al. 2008; regarding rodents, see: Davis et al.
1993; Fendt and Fanselow 1999; LeDoux 2000; Maren 2001;
Christian and Thompson 2003; Fanselow and Poulos 2005; Pape
and Pare 2010; regarding monkeys, see: Davis et al. 2008; regard-
ing humans, see: Rosen and Schulkin 1998; O¨hman and Mineka
2001; Delgado et al. 2006; O¨hman 2008; Davis et al. 2009; Milad
and Quirk 2012), little is known about the neurobiological mech-
anisms or the psychological corollaries of relief-learning. Such
knowledge would be important also from an applied perspective:
The more distinct the underlying processes of punishment- and
relief-learning are, the more likely they contribute independently
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Fly
Punishment- and reward-learning
When flies receive an odor followed by an electric shock, they sub-
sequently avoid this odor because it predicts shock (Quinn et al.
1974; Tully and Quinn 1985). Specifically, a two-group reciprocal-
training paradigm is used (Fig. 3): One group of flies receives odor
A followed by electric shock (denoted as “–”), whereas odor B is
presented alone (A–/B). The second group of flies receives re-
ciprocal training (A/B–). Then, both groups are tested in a
forced-choice situation for their relative preferences between A
and B. It turns out that punishment of A tips the balance between
A and B in favor of B, while punishment of B biases choice in favor
of A. An associative learning index (abbreviated as LI in Figs. 3, 5
[below]) is then calculated on the basis of this difference in pref-
erence between the two reciprocally trained groups. In addition
to such punishment-learning, an appetitive version of the para-
digm is available which uses sugar as reward (Tempel et al.
1983): When flies receive an odor together with a sugar reward,
they subsequently show an increase in preference for this odor
because it predicts reward. Thus, the paradigm is “bivalent” in
the sense that it can reveal both decreases in odor preference after
punishment-learning, and increases in odor preference after
reward-learning. This bivalent nature of the task is essential for
the ensuing discussion.
The cellular and molecular networks underlying short-term
memory after punishment-learning have been studied in some de-
tail (Fig. 4; regarding longer-term forms of memory and mecha-
nisms of memory consolidation, see the recent studies by, e.g.,
Placais et al. 2012 or Perisse et al. 2013 and references therein).
Briefly, upon presentation of an odor, a particular combination
of olfactory sensory neurons on the antennae and maxillary palps
is activated according to the ligand profiles of the respectively ex-
pressed receptor proteins. As a rule, all sensory neurons expressing
the same receptor protein then converge at a single glomerulus
in the antennal lobe, where they provide output to mostly uni-
glomerular projection neurons. The combination of projection
neurons activated by a given odor is shaped, in addition, by lateral
connections among the antennal lobe glomeruli. In the next step,
projection neurons connect to both mushroom body Kenyon cells
and lateral horn neurons as the third-order processing stages (see
Laurent et al. 2001 for a discussion of temporal-coding aspects in
olfaction). The electric shock, in turn, triggers a reinforcement sig-
nal, likely in a subset of dopaminergic neurons which carry this
signal to many if not all Kenyon cells (Schwaerzel et al. 2003;
Riemensperger et al. 2005; Kim et al. 2007; Claridge-Chang et al.
2009; Mao and Davis 2009; Aso et al. 2010, 2012; Pech et al.
2013; for larval Drosophila, see Schroll et al. 2006; Selcho et al.
2009). In contrast, as mentioned above, only a subset of the
Kenyon cells is activated by the odor. It is only in these particular
Kenyon cells, due to the coincidence of the odor-induced activity
and the shock-induced reinforcement signal, that an odor–shock
short-term memory trace is formed. Such a memory trace conceiv-
ably consists in a modulation of connection between the Kenyon
cells and their output neurons (Sejourne et al. 2011), with the
AC-cAMP-PKA signaling cascade as one of the necessary processes
involved in molecular coincidence detection (Zars et al. 2000;
Thum et al. 2007; Blum et al. 2009; Tomchik and Davis 2009; for
a similar conclusion for appetitive learning, see Gervasi et al.
2010; for discussions of purely physiology-based conclusions
about memory trace localization, see Heisenberg and Gerber
2008; for a general critique of the concept of memory trace locali-
zation, see Menzel 2013). If, after training, the learned odor is per-
ceived, activity in the mushroom body output neurons—by virtue
of their modified input from the Kenyon cells—is altered such that
conditioned olfactory avoidance can take place (Sejourne et al.
2011). Interestingly, in accord with prediction-error signaling
(Rescorla 1988), punishment-trained odors not only enable condi-
tionedbehavior but alsoapparently induce feedbackontodopami-
nergic neurons (Riemenspergeret al. 2005; see the seminal studyof
Hammer 1993 for a corresponding finding in honeybee appetitive
learning). Other, nontrained odors support conditioned avoid-
ance only to the extent that they are similar in quality (Niewalda
et al. 2011; Campbell et al. 2013; Barth et al. 2014) and/or intensity
(Yarali et al. 2009a) to the actually trained odor. Appetitive learn-
ing, using sugar as reward is, in principle, organized in a similar
way (e.g., Schwaerzel et al. 2003; Keene et al. 2006; Trannoy et al.
2011), with at least two significant differences:
† It has been argued that, in addition to the Kenyon cells, there
may be an odor-reward short-term memory trace in the projec-
tion neurons (Drosophila, Thum et al. 2007; honeybee, Menzel
2001; Giurfa and Sandoz 2012; Menzel 2012; but see Peele
et al. 2006). However, inDrosophila at least, independent confir-
mation of this is so far lacking (see discussions in Heisenberg
and Gerber 2008; Michels et al. 2011).
† The reinforcing effect of reward involves aminergic neurons
distinct from those mediating punishment (Schwaerzel et al.
2003; Burke et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2012), such that distinct sets
of Kenyon cell output synapses are likely to be modulated to
accommodate conditioned approach.
The net effect of driving or blocking signaling through a set
of dopaminergic neurons covered by the TH-Gal4 expression pat-
tern is to induce or impair, respectively, aversive memories
(e.g., Schwaerzel et al. 2003; Schroll et al. 2006; Aso et al. 2010,
2012). The corresponding manipulations using the TDC-Gal4 ex-
pression pattern to drive octopaminergic neurons, or the tbHM18
mutant (CG1543) to impair octopamine biosynthesis, have
Figure 1. Event-timing and valence. For the “Good” and the “Bad”
things in life, two aspects matter in particular: What made them
happen? What made them cease? The diagram illustrates that the
On-set of something good (top left; e.g., finding food, a salary increase)
can act as a reward, while the On-set of something bad (bottom left;
e.g., being stung by a bee, being sent to prison) can act as punishment.
In turn, however, the Off-set of pain upon cooling the sting or release from
prison entails an oppositely valenced aspect, relief (bottom right); likewise,
having your lollipop pilfered as a kid or experiencing a salary cut entail
negatively valenced frustration (top right). This review is chiefly concerned
with the mnemonic consequences of punishment (red color code
throughout) and relief (green color code throughout). We consistently
plot those behavioral measures toward the top of the y-axes that indicate
positive valence, and consistently plot measures indicating negative
valence toward the bottom of the y-axes. Please note that despite detailed
coverage of the good and the bad, the ugly is ignored throughout (Leone
1966).
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corresponding net effects in the appetitive domain (e.g.,
Schwaerzel et al. 2003; Schroll et al. 2006; Burke et al. 2012).
There is, however, clearly no simple dichotomy in reinforce-
ment processing, dopamine for punishment and octopamine for
reward: A subset of dopaminergic neurons from the so-called
PAM-cluster mediates appetitive reinforcement (Burke et al.
2012; Liu et al. 2012), and genetic distortions of the dopamine re-
ceptor gene Dop1R1 (CG9652, also known as dumb) fittingly com-
promise both appetitive and aversive learning (Kim et al. 2007;
Burke et al. 2012; Qin et al. 2012). Current work is beginning to
BOX 1. Relief-learning—safety-learning
We use the term relief-learning specifically to imply the learning of an
association between a stimulus and the offset of punishment. It was
Konorski (1948) who initially proposed that the occurrence of a stimu-
lus during the falling phase of a punishment signal could result in a
positively valenced memory for this stimulus. In other words, in addi-
tion to their punishing effect, punishments may induce a delayed
state of relief supporting positively valenced memories.
An alternative view is that repeated exposure to the punishment
within the experimental context establishes this context as a danger-
ous one. Within such a dangerous context, a stimulus that is present-
ed in an explicitly unpaired manner with the punishment could come
to signal a subsequent period of safety. In other words, the actual
absence of a contextually predicted punishment during and after the
stimulus can lead to a positive prediction error (“better-than expect-
ed”), supporting a positively valenced memory for it (Rescorla 1988
and references therein).
Safety-learning, but not relief-learning, would thus be possible
with unpaired or temporally randomized presentations of stimulus
and punishment (for review, see Kong et al. 2013). As in such safety-
learning procedures, the stimulus becomes a conditioned inhibitor
predicting the nonoccurrence of the punishment and can reduce con-
textual fear, increase the exploration of unprotected environments,
act as a positive secondary reinforcer, reduce immobility in the forced
swim test, ameliorate the consequences of chronic mild stress, and
promote neurogenesis (Rogan et al. 2005; Pollak et al. 2008;
Christianson et al. 2012). Notably, after safety-learning of an auditory
stimulus, less-than baseline evoked auditory potentials are induced in
the lateral amygdala but increased evoked potentials in the caudopu-
tamen (Rogan et al. 2005). At the same time, there is an activation of
inhibitory pathways inside the amygdala that is different from those
activations underlying fear extinction (Amano et al. 2010). No amyg-
daloid effects are found for relief-learning, however (see main text)
(Andreatta et al. 2012). We finally note that neurons in the basolateral
amygdala that show increased firing to a safety-learned stimulus
appear to partially overlap with those activated by reward-related
stimuli (Sangha et al. 2013).
Returning to procedures that consistently present the stimulus
shortly after punishment, the issue is that under these conditions the-
oretically relief- as well as safety-learning could occur (see Fig. 2).
How can one, in these cases, experimentally discriminate between
relief- and safety-based explanations (see also discussions in Wagner
and Larew 1985; Malaka 1999)?
† In a repetitive training design, safety-learning should monotonically
decrease as the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) lengthens, because the
stimulus moves closer in time toward the next punishment, short-
ening the following safety period. In most preparations looked at,
the ISI-dependency appears bell-shaped (Plotkin and Oakley 1975;
Maier et al. 1976; Tanimoto et al. 2004; for related findings, see
Hellstern et al. 1998; Franklin et al. 2013a; for a counter-example,
see Moscovitch and LoLordo 1968), fitting more naturally to a
relief-based explanation, as the relief signal peaks shortly after pun-
ishment offset. However, the differences in the shape of the
ISI-functions as proposed by relief- and safety-based models are
subtle (Malaka 1999 loc. cit. Figs. 4b,5) and difficult to ascertain
experimentally, in particular when the learning scores are low.
† Safety-learning arguably requires multiple training trials, because
only when the context is sufficiently “charged” by previous trials
will there be a positive prediction error during the subsequent
trials, and the stimulus can become a safety-signal. While a single
presentation of a stimulus with punishment offset can result in a
positively valenced memory (e.g., Wagner and Larew 1985; for
related findings, see Hellstern et al. 1998; Franklin et al. 2013a), in
most cases multiple pairings are required (Heth 1976 and referenc-
es therein; for Drosophila, see Yarali et al. 2008). Note that, unless
one assumes implausibly rapid context-learning, the sufficiency of a
single training trial argues against a safety-based explanation. A re-
quirement for multiple trials, on the other hand, is consistent with
both relief- and safety-based explanations (for detailed discussions,
see Heth 1976; Wagner and Larew 1985; Malaka 1999).
† As noted, safety-learning should rely on the value of the experimen-
tal context as a signal for the punishment. In rats, Chang et al.
(2003) argued for such context-dependency and thus for a safety-
based explanation: An extinction treatment for the context–punish-
ment association diminished the effect of prior punishment–stimu-
lus training. However, following a very similar reasoning, Yarali
et al. (2008) tested in a Drosophila paradigm whether the initial
punishment–stimulus pairings of a multiple-trial training session
can be substituted by mere exposure to punishment within the ex-
perimental context. This was not found to be the case, offering no
support for a safety-based explanation. Neither argument is particu-
larly strong, though, because Chang et al. (2003) did not actually
demonstrate extinction of the context–punishment association,
and because in flies direct evidence for contextual learning under
the employed conditions is lacking. We note that in honeybee
learning using odors and a sugar reward, changing the context
during the inter-stimulus interval leaves scores unaffected, also
failing to provide evidence for context-mediation (Hellstern et al.
1998).
Obviously, these experimental strategies have given mixed or
tentative results across studies, paradigms, and species, making firm
and general conclusions premature. By our assessment, however, the
relief-based explanation seems to be in the lead at this point—when it
comes to grasping the mnemonic processes related to punishment
offset.
We note that despite the above-sketched conceptual dichotomy,
animals may well have the capacity for both relief- and safety-
learning, so the parametric boundary conditions for their respective
operation and their underlying mechanisms would need to be clari-
fied. Indeed, one can imagine experiments that would parametrically
turn experimental procedures ideal for relief-learning (pairing of the
stimulus with punishment offset) into paradigms optimal for safety-
learning (unpaired presentations of punishment and stimulus).
Figure 2
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disentangle the specific roles for subsets of aminergic neurons,
their target Kenyon cells, and the respectively expressed amine re-
ceptors in the acquisition, consolidation, or retrieval of various
forms of olfactory memory as well as in motivational control of
behavior (e.g., Krashes et al. 2009; Berry et al. 2012; Placais et al.
2012; Perisse et al. 2013; see also Burke et al. 2012); for these as-
pects too, the roles of dopamine and octopamine apparently
transgress the above-mentioned dichotomy. Thus, the striking
valence-specificity of driving or impairing aminergic signaling
seems to be a property of particular neurons and of their specific
target receptors and cellular connectivity, rather than a property
of transmitter systems as whole. A similar picture may be emerg-
ing for mammals as well (Brischoux et al. 2009; Bromberg-Martin
et al. 2010; Ilango et al. 2012; Lammel et al. 2012). Strikingly, even
within the aversive domain there may be dissociations on the lev-
el of aminergic neurons: Activations caused by aversive air puff or
bad tastants in individual midbrain dopamine neurons in the
monkey were either not observed at all (most midbrain dopamine
neurons are instead activated strongly by unpredicted rewards and
reward-predicting stimuli [Schultz 2013]) or were seen only for
aversive air puff, or only for bad taste—but not both (Fiorillo
et al. 2013b, loc. cit. Fig. 9A) (about a
third of the neurons, however, were in-
hibited by both). This could provide the
basis for memories that are specific for
the kind, rather than the mere aversive-
ness, of the punishment employed; in-
deed, distinct dopamine neurons were
activated by cues associated with air puff
versus cues associated with bad taste (Fio-
rillo et al. 2013b, loc. cit. Fig. 9B) (again,
about a third of the neurons were inhibit-
ed by both). In flies it has so far not been
systematically tested whether memories
refer to the specific quality of the rein-
forcer (but see Eschbach et al. 2011); if
they did, this would call for a fundamen-
tal revision of current thinking on how
memories are organized in theDrosophila
brain.
Relief-learning
Compared to punishment- and reward-
learning, relief-learning in Drosophila
(Figs. 3, 5) is much less well understood.
It was first described by Tanimoto et
al. (2004): If an odor is presented after
shock, flies subsequently approach that
odor, arguably (Box 1) because of its asso-
ciation with the relieving cessation of
shock (Figs. 3, 5). That is, a fairly minor
parametric change such as inverting
event timing during training has a rather
drastic qualitative effect: It inverts behav-
ioral valence, such that odor shock
training establishes conditioned avoid-
ance, while shock odor training estab-
lishes conditioned approach toward the
odor.
In a follow-up study, Yarali et al.
(2008) demonstrated that after relief-
training, the preference toward the
trained odor is indeed associatively in-
creased; this effect does not seem to inter-
act with the innate valence of the odor,
but rather adds on to it. That study also suggested that
relief-learning is likely independent of context–shock associa-
tions and that it needs more repetitive but less intense training
than punishment-learning (Fig. 5; see Box 1 for the theoretical
implications of these findings). Namely, relief-learning in Droso-
phila reaches asymptote after six training trials (together with
the given signal-to-noise ratio, this makes relief-learning 10- to
20-fold more laborious than the standard one-trial version of
punishment-learning; note that in all direct comparisons re-
viewed in this paper nothing but the inter-stimulus interval is var-
ied between punishment- and relief-learning procedures) and is
optimal at relatively mild shock intensities. The latter may be
because shocks that are too strong induce anterograde amnesic
effects, such that a subsequent odor presentation remains unrec-
ognized by the flies, preventing the relatively weak effects of
relief-learning. Alternatively, it may be that the more intense
the shock, the longer is the aversive state it induces, such that
the ensuing relief is further delayed. In that case, the optimal tim-
ing of the odor with respect to shock for yielding either type of
memory would depend on shock intensity (Bayer et al. 2007).
Both of these scenarios may offer perspectives on the nature of
Figure 3. (Legend on next page)
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“trauma” (Box 2) in the sense that massive or mild adverse expe-
riences may induce punishment and relief memories to a lesser
or stronger extent.
The temporal pattern of decay of relief-memory differs from
both punishment- and reward-memories (Fig. 5; Yarali et al.
2008; Diegelmann et al. 2013b): Over the first 4 h following train-
ing, relief-memory decays much more slowly than punishment-
memory, as is reminiscent of the slow initial decay rate of reward-
memory (Tempel et al. 1983; Schwaerzel et al. 2007; Krashes and
Waddell 2008). For longer retention periods, however, only multi-
ple, temporally spaced training trials result in longer-term (24-h)
punishment-memory (Tully et al. 1994; Isabel et al. 2004; Diegel-
mann et al. 2013b), whereas for longer-term reward-memory
even a single training trial suffices (Krashes and Waddell 2008;
Colomb et al. 2009). For relief-learning, despite using multiple,
spaced training trials, Diegelmann et al. (2013b) found no longer-
term relief-memory (Fig. 5). Also, unlike both punishment- and
reward-learning, relief-learning fails to induce amnesia-resistant
memory (Fig. 5; Diegelmann et al. 2013b). If both punishment-
and relief-memories were formed in a natural string of events
around a painful experience, these findings may be of practical im-
portance: While trying to erase punishment-memory, one may
unwittingly also erase relief-memory. Depending on the relative
strength of these memories and the relative effectiveness of the
treatment, the net effect of such manipulation may be to make
the overall mnemonic effect of the experience even more adverse.
Again, these conclusions may be of relevance for the understand-
ing of “trauma” and its treatment (Box 2).
In two further studies, the neurogenetic bases of fly re-
lief-learning were investigated: First, the role of the white gene
(CG2759) in relief-learning was tested (Yarali et al. 2009b). The
white gene product forms one-half of an ATP-binding transmem-
brane transporter (O’Hare et al. 1984). Its reported cargoes are
the signaling molecule cGMP, as well as a heterogeneous set of
molecules required for the synthesis of eye pigments and seroto-
nin (Sullivan and Sullivan 1975; Howells et al. 1977; Sullivan
et al. 1979, 1980; Koshimura et al. 2000;
Evans et al. 2008). The white1118 muta-
tion enhances punishment-learning (Di-
egelmann et al. 2006; Yarali et al. 2009b)
and reduces relief-learning (Yarali et al.
2009b), while leaving unaltered the re-
flexive avoidance behavior toward the
shock. It thus seems that specifically the
mnemonic effect of shock, the “take-
home message” of the painful event, is
more negative for the white1118 mutant.
Whether this genetic effect in the
white1118 mutant is molecularly related
to altered levels of biogenic amines is a
matter of controversy (Sitaraman et al.
2008; Yarali et al. 2009b). Interestingly,
genetic variance in the human homolog
of thewhite gene (ABCG1) has been relat-
ed to susceptibility to mood and panic
disorders (Nakamura et al. 1999).
Second, Yarali and Gerber (2010)
compared relief-learning to both punish-
ment- and reward-learning in terms of
sensitivity to manipulations of aminergic
signaling. Blocking synaptic output from
a subset of dopaminergic neurons de-
fined by the TH-Gal4 driver partially
impairs punishment-learning (see also
Schwaerzel et al. 2003; Aso et al. 2010,
2012); however, relief-learning remains
intact. As for the comparison to reward-
learning, interfering with another set of
dopaminergic neurons, which need to
provide output for reward-learning to oc-
cur (defined by the DDC-Gal4 driver)
(Burke et al. 2012; Liu et al. 2012), also
leaves relief-learning intact. Further-
more, the tbhM18 mutation, compromis-
ing octopamine biosynthesis, impairs
reward-learning (see also Schwaerzel
et al. 2003), but not relief-learning. It
therefore appears that relief-learning is
neurogenetically distinguishable from
both punishment- and reward-learning.
Importantly, however, roles of dopamine
or octopamine signaling in relief-learn-
ing cannot be ruled out because in none
of the experiments described was the
Figure 3. Punishment- and relief-learning in Drosophila. (A) Image of a female adult fruit fly
Drosophila melanogaster (from Demerec and Kaufmann 1973). A typical female fly is 3–4 mm in
length; males are 0.5 mm smaller. (B) Histological preparation of an adult Drosophila brain. Shown
is a frontal section stained using the reduced silver technique. Cell nuclei are visible as small purple
dots; nerve tracts can be discerned as purple fibers. Blue and pale-blue stains indicate regions of synap-
tic contact (neuropil). The mushroom body calyces can be distinguished as large, round, paired
pale-blue structures toward the top of the preparation (from www.flybrain.org); please note that the
laterally situated visual brain areas (retina, lamina, medulla, lobula), which comprise almost half of
the fly’s brain, are cropped from the image. A typical fly brain comprises 100,000 neurons and is
450 mm in width. (C) Wheel apparatus for Drosophila relief- and punishment-learning, partially disas-
sembled for clarity. For training, a cohort of 60–80 flies is loaded to a training tube lined inside with an
electrifiable copper grid (brown tube at top of device); to the left of the training tube, a black odor con-
tainer can be discerned. These odor containers can be changed such that either odor A is presented with
or another odor B without electric shock. After training, flies are transferred to a neighboring position on
the wheel. In that position, visible in the lower part of the apparatus, two testing tubes are attached,
each linked with an odor container, such that flies face a choice between the two odors. Air is sucked
out of the apparatus by an exhaust pump, meaning that air flows from the outside via the odor contain-
ers and tubes with the flies inside into the exhaust. The floor plate of the apparatus is 30 × 30 cm in
size. When fully assembled, it allows the training and testing of four cohorts of flies simultaneously. (D)
Sketch of the sequence of events for relief- and punishment-learning, using a between-group design.
For both groups of flies, one odor (gray cloud) is presented temporally so far removed from the electric
shock (typically 3–4 min) that no association takes place. For those flies that undergo relief-learning, a
second odor (white cloud) is presented only after an electric shock, at the moment of “relief”
(relief-learning) (please note that for subgroups the chemical identity of the involved odors is
swapped). In contrast, for those flies that undergo punishment-learning this sequence is reversed,
such that the second odor is presented before the shock. These respective cycles of training are repeated
six times; then, flies are given the choice between the two odors in a final test. From this choice behavior
a learning index (LI) (–100; 100) is calculated such that positive scores imply conditioned approach to
the second odor, while negative values imply conditioned avoidance of it (for details, see Yarali et al.
2008; Diegelmann et al. 2013b). Note that when very long intervals between the second odor
(white cloud) and the shock are used, essentially both odors are presented in an explicitly unpaired
way. This could either entail no learning at all, about either odor; or it could establish both odors as
safety-signals (see Box 1). In either case, flies would distribute equally between the two odors in the
final choice test (and this is indeed observed: see F). In other words, the employed discriminative train-
ing–binary choice test paradigm “purifies” scores for punishment- and relief-learning, yet factors out
safety-learning effects. (E) Experimental data showing punishment- or relief-memory, dependent on
the inter-stimulus interval (ISI) during training (the ISI is defined as the time interval from shock
onset to odor onset). The ISI is calculated such that a negative ISI implies odor shock training,
while a positive ISI implies shock odor training. The box plots show that for an ISI of 215 sec,
strong punishment-learning is observed in terms of conditioned avoidance of the odor (negative LIs),
while for an ISI of 40 sec, relief-learning is observed in terms of conditioned approach toward the
odor, which is notably weaker. Box plots show the median as the middle line, and the 25%/75%
and 10%/90% quantiles as box boundaries and whiskers, respectively. Coloring implies
Bonferroni-corrected significance from chance, i.e., from zero. Sample sizes are N ¼ 32 and 35 for
punishment- and relief-memory, respectively. (F) Event-timing and conditioned valence. Test behavior
is plotted across the ISI (–150, –45, –15, 0, 20, 40, 70, 200 sec). For clarity, only the median learning
indices (LI) are displayed. As odor presentation during training is shifted in time past the shock episode,
conditioned behavior changes valence from “Bad” to “Good”: It turns from conditioned avoidance to
conditioned approach. Coloring implies Bonferroni-corrected significance from chance, i.e., from zero.
Sample sizes are N ¼ 8, 24, 32, 47, 24, 35, 12, 12. Data in E,F taken from Yarali et al. (2009b). Gray
circles represent data from Tanimoto et al. (2004), Yarali et al. (2008), or Diegelmann et al. (2013b);
the five gray triangles represent medians of datasets from unpublished experiments using the very
same methods as the aforementioned papers.
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respective type of aminergic signaling completely shut off, due to
methodological constraints (for a detailed discussion, see Yarali
and Gerber 2010). Also, in the tests for octopamine signaling,
relief-learning scores in the genetic controls were low, making it
practically impossible to ascertain decreases in relief-learning
scores; as tendentially increased relief-learning scores may be rec-
ognized in the data provided by Yarali and Gerber (2010), however,
it still seems fair not to assume a strict requirement for octopamine
in relief-learning.
We would like to note that despite the above-mentioned dif-
ferences across punishment-, reward-, and relief-learning, these
three processes are certainly not completely distinct; indeed,
much of the sensory and motor circuitry as well as the molecular
mechanisms will be shared. Thus, the research problem is rather
to understand exactly which processes are shared and which are
specific across these three tasks—and how the fly brain is orga-
nized to accommodate them.
Possible mechanisms underlying relief-learning
The relative timing of events is also a key factor in synaptic plastic-
ity. Typically, in spike-timing dependent plasticity (STDP) (for re-
views, see Bi and Poo 2001; Caporale and Dan 2008; Markram
et al. 2011) a synaptic connection is strengthened when action
Figure 4. Simplified working model of punishment-learning in Drosophila. (A) Timing of events for punishment-learning, and indication of the time
points at which snapshots of activity patterns are displayed in B1–B4. (B) Snapshots of stimulus-evoked activity during training (B1–B3) and testing
(B4). Coloring indicates activity. Please note that both the odors as well as the electric shock activate two pathways each: one to trigger the respective
innate behavior and one detour toward the mushroom body Kenyon cells. It is these detour pathways that feature coincidence detection and associative
plasticity. Also, please note the combined divergence–convergence connectivity between the projection neurons and mushroom body Kenyon cells.
(OSN) Olfactory sensory neurons, (AL) antennal lobe, (PN) projection neurons, (KC) mushroom body Kenyon cells, (DA) a subset of dopaminergic
neurons mediating an internal punishment signal. (B1,B2) Depending on the ligand profiles of the expressed olfactory receptors and the connectivity
within the circuit, a given odor (gray cloud in B1) activates a particular set of olfactory sensory neurons, antennal lobe glomeruli, projection neurons,
and mushroom body Kenyon cells. A different odor (white cloud in B2) activates a different pattern of the respective neurons. As for both these odors
the animals are experimentally naı¨ve, only innate olfactory behavior is expressed; that is, the output of the mushroom body Kenyon cells (open
orange triangles) is not sufficiently strong to activate their postsynaptic partners and thus cannot steer conditioned escape. (B3,B4) Coincidence of a dop-
aminergic punishment signal and odor-induced activity in the odor-specific subset of mushroom body Kenyon cells (B3) (as flies are confined to the train-
ing tube, and no behavioral observations are possible [Fig. 3], the integration of innate shock-related escape with innate olfactory behavioral tendencies
remains unknown). Coincidence is molecularly detected by the type I adenylate cyclase and arguably enacted, at least in part, by phosphorylation of
synapsin and the recruitment of synaptic vesicles for subsequent release. If following this coincidence the previously punished odor is presented again
(B4), it can activate a set of thus potentiated output synapses from the mushroom body Kenyon cells (filled triangles), such that conditioned escape
is possible. Please note that the interplay of innate and conditioned olfactory behavior (B3) remains distressingly little understood. For clarity, the
circuit is numerically simplified and altogether omits a number of neuronal classes including within-antennal lobe interneurons, multiglomerular projec-
tion neurons, and a host of modulatory inputs as well as of mushroom body intrinsic feedback neurons (for references to more detailed accounts, see main
text; consult Laurent et al. 2001 for possible temporal-coding aspects of olfaction).
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potentials in the presynaptic cell precede those in the postsynap-
tic cell, while a reverse order of events weakens the synaptic
connection.
Given the conspicuous parallelism of STDP on the synaptic
level with the timing-dependent switch between punishment
and relief-learning in Drosophila, Drew and Abbott (2006) ven-
tured a computational study to establish whether STDP, operating
at the time scale of milliseconds, can in-
deed lead to behavioral effects on the
time scale of seconds. The authors mod-
eled a circuit in which the odor activates
a subset of Kenyon cells, whereas the
shock excites their postsynaptic partner,
which mediates avoidance. For both
odor- and shock-induced activity, rather
high firing rates were assumed that decay
only slowly (several seconds) upon termi-
nation of the respective stimulus. Then,
the authors implemented an STDP rule,
operating at the millisecond-scale (in-
deed, STDP takes place at the Kenyon
cell output synapses, as shown in the
locust [Cassenaer and Laurent 2007,
2012]). As long as relatively high spiking
rates and relatively slow decay rates are
assumed, this model does account for
the effect of the relative timing of odor
and shock at the behavioral level, which
occurs at the scale of several seconds.
However, the assumed strong and per-
sistent spiking activity has not been
observed in Drosophila Kenyon cells;
rather, it turns out that these cells fire
strikingly few spikes at the beginning
and/or at the end of odor presentation
(Murthy et al. 2008; Turner et al. 2008;
for moth Kenyon cells, see Ito et al.
2008). Also, it remains unclear whether
the shock signal indeed impinges upon
the postsynaptic partners of the Kenyon
cells. The data so far rather suggest
that the Kenyon cells themselves receive
a dopaminergic reinforcement signal:
Dopamine receptors are enriched in the
Kenyon cells (Han et al. 1996; Kim et al.
2003), and restoring receptor function
in the Kenyon cells rescues the learning
impairment of a dopamine receptor
mutant (Kim et al. 2007). Furthermore,
synaptic output from Kenyon cells dur-
ing the training phase has repeatedly
been found to be dispensable for pun-
ishment-learning (Dubnau et al. 2001;
McGuire et al. 2001; Schwaerzel et al.
2003). Altogether, Drew and Abbott’s
(2006) STDP-based model thus does not
embrace the empirical findings particu-
larly well. We note, however, that the
STDP rule is sensitive to neuromodula-
tory effects, as shown for the locust
Kenyon cell output synapses (Cassenaer
and Laurent 2012), and incorporating
such effects may result in more realistic
STDP-based models of punishment-, re-
ward-, and relief-learning. In any event,
the STDP-based model by Drew and
Abbott (2006) does not predict safety-learning as a result of un-
paired presentations of odor and shock. Such unpaired-train-
ing can, however, have mnemonic consequences: In larval
Drosophila unpaired presentations of odor and a sugar reward
turn the odor into a predictor of no-reward (Saumweber et al.
2011; Barth et al. 2014; concerning honeybees, see Hellstern
et al. 1998 and references therein). Also, given the innate
Figure 5. Features of relief-learning in wild-type Drosophila. (A) Relief-learning requires multiple trials.
Coloring implies Bonferroni-corrected significance from chance, i.e., from zero. Sample size from left to
right: 16, 15, 20, 19, 23. Data taken from Yarali et al. (2008). (B) Relief-learning is strongest at interme-
diate shock intensities. Coloring implies Bonferroni-corrected significance from chance, i.e., from zero.
Sample size from left to right: 8, 7, 12, 15, 7. Data taken from Yarali et al. (2008). (C) Time course of
memory decay differs between relief-learning and punishment-learning. Relief-memory scores are
stable for 75 min, yet have decayed fully by 24 h after training. In contrast, punishment-memory
scores decay to about half within the first 75 min and then remain stable. Coloring implies
Bonferroni-corrected significance from chance, i.e., from zero. Sample size N ¼ 51, 35, 46, 43, 40
for relief-memory and N ¼ 20 in all cases of punishment-memory. Data taken from Diegelmann
et al. (2013b). (D) Cold-amnesia abolishes relief-memory, but spares about half of punishment-memory
scores. Coloring implies Bonferroni-corrected significance from chance, i.e., from zero. Sample size N ¼
14 in all cases. Data taken from Diegelmann et al. (2013b).
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avoidance of odors typically observed in the current paradigm, the
attraction to odors after unpaired presentations of odor and shock
in adult Drosophila can be understood as reflecting safety-learning
(e.g., Niewalda et al. 2011, loc. cit. Fig. S5; Barth et al. 2014).
Alternatively, the event timing-dependent transition be-
tween punishment and relief-learning may be rooted in the very
molecular mechanism of coincidence detection. It is likely that
during punishment-training the type I adenylate cyclase rutabaga
(CG9533) acts as a molecular detector of the coincidence between
a neuromodulatory reinforcement signal and the odor-evoked ac-
tivity in the mushroom body Kenyon cells (Tomchik and Davis
2009; Gervasi et al. 2010). Due to this coincidence, in the respec-
tive odor-activated Kenyon cells, cAMP would be produced and
PKA be activated, leading to the phosphorylation of downstream
effectors, conceivably including Synapsin (CG3985). Synapsin
phosphorylation would, in turn, allow the recruitment of reserve-
pool vesicles toward the readily releasable pool (for discussion, see
Diegelmann et al. 2013a), enabling a stronger synaptic output
upon odor presentation after training and eventually leading to
conditioned avoidance. Consistent with this scenario, the im-
pairments in punishment-learning by mutations in the rutabaga
and synapsin genes are not additive (Knapek et al. 2010); also, in
odor–sugar associative learning of larval Drosophila, the impair-
ment of the syn97 mutant cannot be rescued by a transgenically ex-
pressed synapsin that lacks functional PKA/CaMKII recognition
sites (Michels et al. 2011; for recent data suggesting a role of
CaMKII for Synapsin phosphorylation in olfactory habituation,
see Sadanandappa et al. 2013).
Could both punishment and relief-learning possibly be ac-
commodated in the same Kenyon cells, based on an event timing-
dependent, bidirectional modulation of AC-cAMP-PKA signaling?
This was explored in a computational study by Yarali et al. (2012).
In their model, upon the application of shock-alone, all Kenyon
cells receive a shock-induced neuromodulatory signal, which trig-
gers G-protein signaling, consequently activating the adenylate
cyclase. As active adenylate cyclase accumulates, the reverse reac-
tion, that is, deactivation of the adenylate cyclase, also takes
place. Once shock is over and the neuromodulatory signal has
waned, this deactivation of the adenylate cyclase becomes the
dominant reaction, leading eventually to the deactivation of all
adenylate cyclase molecules. The level of cAMP production
caused by such shock-alone stimulation is taken as a “baseline”
level and assumed to already potentiate the output from all
Kenyon cells to the downstream avoidance circuit. Application
of an odor, in turn, raises the presynaptic Ca2+ concentration spe-
cifically in the respective subset of model Kenyon cells coding for
this odor. Such presynaptic Ca2+ multiplicatively increases the
rate constants for both the G-protein-dependent activation of ad-
enylate cyclase and its deactivation (Yovell and Abrams 1992;
Abrams et al. 1998). Thus, the net effect of Ca2+ on the adenylate
cyclase-dynamics depends on its timing. That is, Ca2+ has no net
effect if it arrives long before the neuromodulatory activation
of adenylate cyclase has begun, or long after the deactivation
of adenylate cyclase has been completed. Note that this model
thus also does not predict safety-learning resulting from unpaired
presentations of odor and shock, although such learning likely
does take place. On the other hand, if the Ca2+ arrives while ade-
nylate cyclase-activation is dominant, it speeds up this activation,
whereas if it arrives while adenylate cyclase is predominantly be-
ing deactivated, this deactivation is accelerated. Accordingly, in
simulated punishment-training the shock-induced neuromodu-
latory signal activates the adenylate cyclase in all Kenyon cells.
Only in those Kenyon cells that code for the particular odor
does a rise in Ca2+ coincide with this activation phase, speeding
it up. The resulting above-baseline level of cAMP is then assumed
to potentiate the output from these Kenyon cells further, beyond
BOX 2. Punishment, relief, and “trauma”
Remembering past adverse, punishing events is, in principle, adaptive
since it helps us to avoid or to cope with future dangerous situations.
However, emotional memories of extremely distressing “traumatic”
events can become overwhelming, leading to psychiatric complica-
tions such as post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). Core symptoms of
PTSD are intrusions and flashbacks, i.e., unusually vivid memories of
the traumatic event. Such a traumatic event can be criminal victimiza-
tions, accidents, combat experiences, or childhood maltreatment
(summarized in Nemeroff et al. 2006). While the frequency, type, and
intensity of such episodes are critical determinants for developing
PTSD, it remains striking that ,30% of those exposed to comparable
sequences of events go on to develop PTSD. There are several person-
related risk factors such as polymorphisms in several genes (e.g., DRD2
or MAO), female gender, and preexisting psychiatric conditions, such
as depression and alcohol abuse, as well as ineffective coping strate-
gies. To develop a conceptual handle on PTSD, therefore, not only do
the status of the subject and aspects of punishment-learning have to
be considered (e.g., genotype and personal history of the subject,
graveness of the traumatic experiences, levels of generalization, the
temporal dynamics of memory consolidation, retrieval-induced recon-
solidation, extinction, and spontaneous recovery), but mechanisms of
operant learning as well as nonassociative processes are also likely to be
of significance (for discussions, see Siegmund and Wotjak 2006; Riebe
et al. 2012).
Such complexity makes it difficult to establish comprehensive
experimental models of PTSD. Also, as the graveness of the events is
of significance for the switch from adaptive aversive learning to
trauma, it is intrinsically problematic to develop such experimental
models because this graveness defines the boundaries of what is ethi-
cally acceptable in experimental settings, not only in humans but in
animals as well. In other words, if the experimental treatment is grave
enough to induce PTSD, it may arguably not be ethical, whereas
when it remains within ethical bounds, it may not be grave enough
to induce PTSD. The existing rodent models of PTSD employ a single
exposure to an intensive foot shock or to a predator to model the
traumatic experience (e.g., Adamec and Shallow 1993; Siegmund
and Wotjak 2007) and are useful for observing and understanding
the long-lasting associative and nonassociative symptoms of fear
(e.g., conditioned fear of contextual features of the traumatic experi-
ence, social anxiety, neophobia, exaggerated startle). Such models
should allow investigation into whether such experiences also lead
to conditioned relief and whether such conditioned relief impacts
“rodent-PTSD.”
Regarding PTSD in humans, we find it reasonable to suppose
that, though perhaps restricted to an implicit level, there is a moment
of relief upon the cessation of a traumatic event and that this may be of
mnemonic, psychological, and behavioral significance to the trauma-
tized person. In particular, to the extent that repetitions are “needed”
to induce trauma, increasing or broadening of generalization of relief-
type memories may be relevant entry points to ameliorate the impact
of a first relatively mild such episode and/or to protect the patient in a
possible next such episode. Furthermore, one may ask whether the ces-
sation of intrusive flashback memories may cause relief, whether such
relief contributes to the maintenance of the disorder or can be exploit-
ed in therapy, or whether it may rather complicate therapy if such
relief-learning repeatedly happens in therapeutic settings so as to un-
wittingly induce attachment to these settings. Basic and translational
research on punishment- and relief-learning with relatively mild aver-
sive events may therefore also turn out useful with regard to trauma
and PTSD.
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the potentiation in all Kenyon cells due to the shock-alone, thus
enabling the trained odor subsequently to induce conditioned
avoidance more readily than other odors. In turn, in simulated
relief-training, the odor-induced rise in Ca2+ follows the shock-
induced neuromodulatory signal that coincides with the deacti-
vation phase of the adenylate cyclase. Therefore, in the particular
odor-coding Kenyon cells, the adenylate cyclase is deactivated
faster, resulting in cAMP production below the baseline level.
Consequently, the output from these Kenyon cells is less potenti-
ated compared to that of all other Kenyon cells (or compared to
a situation where this odor is presented long before or long after
the shock), rendering the trained odor less likely to induce con-
ditioned avoidance than other odors. In a choice situation this
would result in relative approach toward the trained odor.
Thus, with this model, the timing-dependence of associative
function on the behavioral level can be simulated, using Ca2+ as
a stand-in for odor, and neuromodulator as a stand-in for shock.
The bidirectional regulation of the very coincidence detector,
the adenylate cyclase, is used to explain the effect of event-timing
on learning. This now invites experimental scrutiny, especially
with respect to the requirement for the AC-cAMP-PKA cascade
and the Kenyon cells for relief-learning
as well as the identity of the respective
neuromodulatory signal.
In any event, both Drew and
Abbott’s (2006) STDP-based model and
the adenylate cyclase-based model by
Yarali et al. (2012) follow the “canonical”
view of short-term mnemonic odor cod-
ing in the mushroom body, holding
that odors are coded combinatorially
across the full array of g-lobe Kenyon
cells (regarding longer-term memory,
this has recently been challenged by
Perisse et al. 2013, suggesting that the
a/b set of Kenyon cells responsible
for 3-h memory may be internally “mul-
tiplexed” by valence and/or mem-
ory strength). That is, punishment and
relief-learning rely on the same olfactory
representation such that both kinds of
learning modify the same Kenyon cell
output synapses onto the same down-
stream circuit (depicted in Fig. 4 for
punishment-learning)—but in oppo-
site ways. While this scenario readily
accounts for the observed opposite con-
ditioned behaviors of avoidance and
approach, more fine-grained investiga-
tions into conditioned behavior, and
into the anatomy of the mushroom
body lobes, may show up the shortcom-
ings of such scenarios: Punishment-
learning may modulate kinds of behavior




Learning that a cue predicts an electric
shock is one of the best-studied cases
of Pavlovian conditioning in the rat
(e.g., for reviews, see Fendt and Fanselow
1999; LeDoux 2000; Maren 2001; Davis
2006; Ehrlich et al. 2009; Pape and Pare 2010). The range of con-
ditioned behaviors toward the learned cue can be understood as
making the animal ready for the predicted aversive event and in-
cludes protective and defense-related behaviors such as orienting,
avoidance, freezing, and potentiation of reflexes including the
startle response to facilitate fight-or-flight behavior, as well as au-
tonomic changes such as tachycardia, hypertonia, and an activa-
tion of the hypothalamic–pituitary–adrenal axis. Because this
syndrome of conditioned effects is similar to the signs of fear in
humans, this paradigm is typically referred to as fear con-
ditioning. However, given that for flies there are no arguments
for such a comprehensive similarity to human fear, and given
that for the present cross-species review we want to use a terminol-
ogy that is consistent across species, we will use the term punish-
ment-learning instead of fear conditioning for the remainder of
this contribution.
In punishment-learning procedures for the rat, the cues to
be learned can be visual, as already mentioned, or olfactory, tac-
tile, auditory, or comprising contextual combinations of stimuli
from multiple modalities, provided the respective sensory systems
are mature (Hunt et al. 1994; Richardson et al. 1995, 2000). Rats
Figure 6. (Legend on next page)
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can learn the association between cue and punishment, which is
typically delivered as a foot shock via a metal floor grid, after just
one pairing (e.g., Sacchetti et al. 1999); however, more pairings
lead to stronger and more stable memories. Further variables
which modulate the strength and speed of learning are the
intensity of the cue as well as of the shock, and in particular
the timing of cue and shock relative to each other: According
to the predictive character of the process, learning is not best
when shock is applied with the beginning of the cue but, rather,
when the shock is applied upon the end of the cue (“delay” pro-
cedure). When a temporal gap is left between cue offset and
shock onset (“trace” procedure), rats learn less well as the dura-
tion of the gap increases. This timing-dependency not only
matches that discussed above for the fly, but it is indeed one of
the rather few universally observed features of associative learn-
ing, on the respectively adaptive time scales ranging from hun-
dreds of milliseconds in the case of eye-blink conditioning to
hours in the case of flavor-aversion learning (cf. Rescorla 1988,
loc. cit. Fig. 1).
There are different ways to test behaviorally whether the rats
have established the association between cue and shock. Here, we
focus on the modulation of startle amplitude as a read-out. The
startle response (Figs. 6, 8) can be elicited by sudden and intense
stimuli (historically, the sound of pistol shots has been used in hu-
man subjects [Strauss 1929]) and consists of short-latent muscle
contractions collectively serving to protect the organism (espe-
cially eyes and neck) and preparing it for subsequent fight-or-
flight. It is an evolutionarily well-conserved and much-studied
reflex (Koch 1999), such that the neural mechanisms of the startle
response itself and of its modulations are known in quite some de-
tail in rodents (Fendt and Fanselow 1999; Davis 2006; Davis et al.
2009), monkeys (Davis et al. 2008), and man (Davis et al. 2008,
2009, van Well et al. 2012). The startle response is experimentally
elicited by a sudden, very loud noise from a loudspeaker and can
be measured by motion-sensitive transducers underneath the
floor grid of the measurement apparatus (Fig. 6). This startle re-
sponse, despite being phylogenetically ancient, is certainly not
completely hard-wired: Although the motor programs are qualita-
tively rather stereotyped, the amplitude of the startle response is
higher when the animal is afraid. That is, after animals (or hu-
mans) are trained such that they associate a cue with an electric
shock, the amplitude of the startle response is increased in the
presence as compared to the absence of the cue, an effect called
fear-potentiated startle (Brown et al. 1951; Lipp et al. 1994;
Koch 1999; Grillon 2002; Davis 2006). It is particularly important
in the current context that the startle response has a nonzero
baseline; that is, both increases and decreases in startle amplitude
can be measured! Indeed, after associating a cue with a reward
such as food or rewarding brain stimulation, the amplitude of
the startle response is decreased in the presence of the cue (Schmid
et al. 1995; Koch et al. 1996; Steidl et al. 2001; Schneider and
Spanagel 2008). Thus, as in the case already discussed for flies,
the paradigm of startle modulation is bivalent: Under neutral con-
ditions startle is normal, while when expecting something bad
startle is potentiated, and when expecting something good startle
is attenuated.
Concerning the circuits underlying punishment-learning in
rats (Fig. 7), it is well established that the amygdala plays a
critical role (summarized in Maren
2001, Ehrlich et al. 2009, and Pape and
Pare 2010). The lateral/basolateral part
of the amygdala features as a conver-
gence site for cue and shock processing.
Information about the cue is carried by
projections from the thalamic geniculate
nucleus and the sensory cortices, while
information about the shock is carried
by projections from posterior intralami-
nar nuclei of the thalamus and caudal in-
sular cortex. During acquisition of the
cue–shock association, long-term poten-
tiation of the synapses from the cortical
sensory and thalamic geniculate projec-
tions to projection neurons within the
lateral/basolateral amygdala is induced,
thus effectively potentiating the cue’s
sensory pathway to the lateral/basolat-
eral amygdala (McKernan and Shinnick-
Gallagher 1997; Rogan et al. 1997).
Furthermore, it is believed that long-
term depression occurs in sensory path-
ways mediating cues to the lateral/baso-
lateral amygdala whose activity is un-
or anti-correlated with shock occurrence
(Heinbockel and Pape 2000). Thus, when
after training the learned cue is presented
alone, projection neurons of the lateral/
basolateral amygdala will be activated.
These neurons can, in turn, activate pro-
jection neurons in the central nucleus of
the amygdala. The conditioned behavior
is organized via projections from these
central amygdala neurons toward the
midbrain and the brainstem (Fendt and
Fanselow 1999; LeDoux 2000; Maren
Figure 6. Punishment- and relief-learning in the rat. (A) Image of an adult rat (adapted from Koch
1999 with permission from Elsevier # 1999). (B) Histological preparation of a rat brain. Depicted is a
Nissl-stained frontal section at the level of the amygdala and dorsal hippocampus. Intensely stained
regions are somata-rich, lighter stain indicates fiber tracts. A typical rat brain consists of 100 million
neurons and is 2.5 cm in width. (C) Apparatus for measuring the modulation of the startle response
by relief- and punishment-learning in the rat. The animal is placed in a small enclosure (9-cm diameter,
16-cm length). During training, light stimuli can be presented; electric shocks are administered via a
floor grid. During the test a speaker can be used to deliver a loud noise that makes the animal
startle, either in the presence or in the absence of the trained light stimulus. The amplitude of the
startle response is measured by motion-sensitive transducers mounted underneath the floor grid. (D)
Sketch of the sequence of events for relief- or punishment-learning, using a between-group design.
For the group undergoing relief-learning, the light stimulus follows the shock, while for punishment-
learning this sequence is reversed, such that the light stimulus precedes the shock. In the test the am-
plitude of the startle response is measured, either in the presence or in the absence of the light stimulus.
Relative to the startle amplitude upon the loud noise alone, the startle amplitude is attenuated after
relief-learning (indicating positive conditioned valence), while after punishment-learning the startle
amplitude is potentiated (indicating negative conditioned valence). Images of startled rats modified
from Koch (1999) (adapted with permission from Elsevier # 1999). (E) Experimental data showing
relief- or punishment-memory, depending on the inter-stimulus interval during training (the inter-
stimulus interval [ISI] is defined as the time interval from shock onset to light onset). In order to
display “Good” (positive conditioned valence) toward the top, startle attenuation is plotted toward
the top of the y-axis; in turn, and in deliberate breach of the convention in the field, startle potentiation
is plotted toward the bottom of the y-axis in order to display “Bad” (negative conditioned valence)
toward the bottom. In line with convention, the sign of the startle modulation is presented as, respec-
tively, negative or positive, because the actual behavior of the rats consists of less or more startle, respec-
tively. Please note that the ISI is defined such that a negative ISI implies light shock training, while a
positive ISI implies shock light training. The box plots to the left show that for an ISI of 24.5 sec,
punishment-learning is observed in terms of potentiated startle (red), while for an ISI of 2.5 sec,
relief-learning is observed in terms of attenuated startle (green). Notably, the two types of startle mod-
ulation do not appear as drastically different in strength as in flies (Fig. 3). Box plots show the median as
the bold middle line, and the 25%/75% and 10%/90% quantiles as box boundaries and whiskers, re-
spectively. Sample size is N ¼ 16 per group. (F) Event-timing and conditioned valence. Test behavior is
plotted across the ISI. For clarity, only the median scores of startle modulation are displayed, derived
from five experimental groups. As the light presentation is shifted in time past the shock episode
during training, conditioned valence changes from “Bad” to “Good”: it turns from startle potentiation
to startle attenuation. Coloring implies Bonferroni-corrected significance from chance, i.e., from zero.
Sample sizes are N ¼ 12–16 per group. The stippled line shows the behavior of two control groups that
had received either only the cue but no electric shocks at all, or cue and electric shocks at randomized
ISIs. In these control groups a slight decrease in startle is observed, relative to the startle-alone testing
condition (see text for discussion). Data in E,F taken from Andreatta et al. (2012).
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2001), i.e., the potentiation of startle takes place by direct and in-
direct projections from the central amygdala to giant neurons
within the caudal pontine reticular nucleus that in turn activate
spinal motor neurons (Fendt and Fanselow 1999; Koch 1999).
Key observations to support this
working hypothesis come from pharma-
cological inactivation or lesions of the
lateral amygdala in rats, which robustly
block punishment-learning (Hitchcock
and Davis 1986; Helmstetter and Bellgo-
wan 1994; Muller et al. 1997). Impor-
tantly, the functional integrity of the
lateral amygdala is necessary for both
establishing and remembering cue–
shock associations (Muller et al. 1997).
It has further been revealed that long-
term potentiation of the thalamic/
cortical input to the lateral/basolater-
al amygdala underlying punishment-
learning is NMDA receptor-dependent
(Miserendino et al. 1990; Maren et al.
1996) and is controlled by a complex
network of GABA-ergic interneurons
(summarized in Ehrlich et al. 2009).
Activity of these interneurons can be
modulated by several neuropeptides as
well as by serotonin, noradrenalin, and
acetylcholine.
As briefly mentioned above, the am-
plitude of startle is not only potentiated
by learned punishment but can also be
attenuated by cues associated with re-
ward. Such conditioned “pleasure-atten-
uated startle” was first established by
Schmid et al. (1995): In their study, a
light cue was repeatedly paired with a
food reward. After this association was
learned, startle amplitude was attenuated
by the light cue. This effect can be
blocked by lesions of the dopamine neu-
rons within the nucleus accumbens but
not by lesions of the amygdala (Koch
et al. 1996). This first study on the neural
basis of pleasure-attenuated startle sug-
gested that the mesoaccumbal system
that is generally crucial for reward-re-
lated learning (for reviews, see, e.g., Car-
dinal and Everitt 2004; Schultz 2013; but
see also Bromberg-Martin et al. 2010;
Ilango et al. 2012; Lammel et al. 2012)
is also important for pleasure-attenuated
startle.
Several studies have also demon-
strated that the nucleus accumbens is
able to modulate punishment-learning.
For example, temporary inactivation of
the nucleus accumbens by local in-
jections of tetrodotoxin or of the mus-
carinic agonist carbachol blocks the
acquisition and expression of punish-
ment-learning (Schwienbacher et al.
2004, 2006; Cousens et al. 2011). How-
ever, manipulating dopamine signaling
within the nucleus accumbens has no ef-
fect on punishment-learning (Josselyn
et al. 2005; Schwienbacher et al. 2005).
This is supported by a recent study showing that the GABA-ergic
but not the dopaminergic neurons in the ventral tegmental area
(projecting to the nucleus accumbens) are activated by punish-
ment (Cohen et al. 2012).
Figure 7. Simplified working model of relief- and punishment-learning in the rat. (A) During
relief-learning, the shock is presented first and the light is presented only afterward. This, we propose,
leads to memory trace formation by the coincidence of light processing and internal reinforcement pro-
cessing in the nucleus accumbens (NAC) of the striatum where some neurons are active upon shock
offset. Upon testing with the light stimulus, output from the nucleus accumbens is suggested to
impinge upon the pontine reticular nucleus (PnC) in the brainstem to mediate startle attenuation. (B)
During punishment-learning, the light is presented first and the shock is presented only afterward.
This is known to lead to memory trace formation by the coincidence of light processing and internal re-
inforcement processing in the lateral amygdala (LA). Upon testing with the light stimulus, output from
the lateral amygdala, via the central amygdala (CA), also projects to the pontine reticular nucleus
(PnC) in the brainstem, but by a pathway that leads to startle potentiation. (MG) Medial geniculate
nucleus, (PIN) posterior intralaminar nuclei. (C) Local transient inactivation, using the GABA-A receptor
agonist muscimol, of either the lateral amygdala (LA) or the nucleus accumbens (NAC) during the test for
conditioned punishment or conditioned relief. Open plots refer to controls injected with saline.
Punishment-learning leads to negative conditioned valence and thus is plotted downward (startle poten-
tiation); relief-learning leads to positive conditioned valence and thus is plotted upward (startle attenu-
ation). Inactivation of the lateral amygdala abolished punishment-memory but leaves relief-memory
intact; in turn, inactivation of the nucleus accumbens leaves punishment-memory intact yet impairs
relief-memory. Sample sizes are N ¼ 7–9 per group. Data in C taken from Andreatta et al. (2012).
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Relief-learning
For the establishment of a relief-learning paradigm on the basis of
the startle response in rats (Andreatta et al. 2012), it seemed sig-
nificant that relief-learning in flies works best with a relatively
long gap between electric shock offset and cue onset (5–25 sec)
(Tanimoto et al. 2004; Yarali et al. 2008). In the vertebrate litera-
ture this kind of procedure has been called “backward-trace” con-
ditioning; for the remainder of this contribution, however, we use
the term relief-learning instead, in order to apply a consistent
nomenclature across the three species covered. In any case, such
a relief-learning type of procedure has been employed relatively
rarely: Often punishment and cue have a coincident onset, but
the cue outlasts the punishment by a long time (Siegel and
Domjan 1974; Walasek et al. 1995), or a rather short cue is present-
ed during or after a rather long aversive stimulus (Heth and
Rescorla 1973). Also, the question investigated has mostly been
whether such a relief-learning type of procedure leads to less
strong learning than punishment-learning. However, there have
been few studies directly suggesting a positive valence of the
learned cue after relief-learning types of procedure: Walasek and
colleagues (1995) used a 1-sec shock and a 1-min cue which had
simultaneous onsets such that the cue outlasted the punishment
by 59 sec. In a subsequent test session, the authors observed an in-
crease in bar pressing for food during the presence of the cue
(compared with bar pressing under baseline conditions), which
was interpreted as “conditioned safety” (see Box 1). In contrast,
punishment-learning (i.e., presentation of the 1-sec shock at the
end of the 1-min cue) in this paradigm resulted in a strong sup-
pression of bar pressing. This suggests that also in rats changes
in the relative timing of cue and punishment do more than affect-
ing whether and how much learning occurs, but rather can affect
the valence of the respective mnemonic effect (for a related find-
ing see also Smith and Buchanan 1954). A different approach was
used by Navratilova et al. (2012): The authors investigated tonic
post-surgical pain and induced relief by pharmacological treat-
ment of that pain. Using a place preference/avoidance apparatus,
such treatment was paired with one compartment of the appara-
tus whereas the other compartment was paired with a placebo
treatment. In a subsequent test session, the animals preferred
the compartment that had been paired with the pain-relief
treatment.
Andreatta et al (2012) decided to use the modulation of
the startle response as a behavioral measure to compare punish-
ment- and relief-learning because it can be modulated bivalently
(Koch 1999); that is, negatively valenced cues, established by pun-
ishment-learning, increase startle amplitude (Brown et al. 1951),
whereas positively valenced cues, established by cue–reward asso-
ciative training, decrease startle amplitude (Schmid et al. 1995).
The relief-learning protocol was matched closely to the estab-
lished punishment-learning protocol (i.e., 15 pairings of a 5-sec
light and a 0.5-sec, 0.8-mA electric foot shock), and varied only
the inter-stimulus interval (ISI, defined as the time interval from
shock onset to light onset) (Fig. 6): Different groups of rats re-
ceived a relief-learning protocol such that the onset of the electric
shock preceded the onset of the 5-sec cue (denoted as positive
ISIs: 3, 6, 12 sec). In addition, groups were included that un-
derwent punishment-learning with a delay (ISI: 24.5 sec) or a
trace procedure (ISIs: 212 sec). Last, but not least, control groups
received either the cue but no electric shock at all, or cue and elec-
tric shock at randomized ISIs. In these control groups it was ob-
served that, relative to the startle-alone testing condition, startle
is slightly decreased when the cue was present (in Fig. 6, bottom
right, the stippled line corresponds to the mean across these con-
trol groups and is referred to as the “baseline” in the following).
Interpretations of this baseline level might be that it represents
an unconditioned distraction effect of the light stimulus on star-
tle, and/or that a mild degree of conditioned safety was induced.
In any event, as the cue is moved in time toward shock onset, star-
tle amplitude increases (Fig. 6). As the cue is moved past the shock,
however, this effect is reversed and startle amplitude decreases.
Importantly, for even longer gaps between shock and cue, startle
amplitude returns to baseline levels (Andreatta et al. 2012). Thus,
with respect to startle modulation as a measure, the cue has ac-
quired negative conditioned valence with an ISI of 24.5 sec, but
positive conditioned valence with an ISI of 3 sec; we refer to these
effects as punishment- and relief-memory, respectively.
Nucleus accumbens and amygdala are respectively
required for relief- and punishment-memory
Given that relief-learning in a startle paradigm can be demon-
strated in the rat, Andreatta et al (2012) asked what its neuronal
underpinnings are. A way to probe whether a brain structure
is acutely required for a particular behavior is by temporarily in-
activating it. This can be done by optogenetic tools (for the
rat, see Zalocusky and Deisseroth 2013), or by local microinjec-
tions of drugs inactivating neuronal firing. A suitable drug for
these purposes is muscimol, a GABA-A receptor agonist, a method
previously applied to a number of different brain structures
and behaviors (e.g., Fendt et al. 2003; Schulz et al. 2004; Mu¨ller
and Fendt 2006). Notably, these local injections silence neural ac-
tivity quickly but are remarkably transient (120 min) (Martin
1991).
Given that relief-learning, just like reward-learning, mani-
fests itself as a decrease in startle in the presence of the learned
cue, it seemed plausible that brain structures concerned with re-
ward-learning are required for relief-learning as well. The usual
first suspect here is the nucleusaccumbens, because, like its human
terminological counterpart, the ventral striatum (which, however,
includes the olfactory tubercle), it is a critical brain structure for or-
ganizing learning and behavior in the appetitive domain (Ikemoto
and Panksepp 1996, 1999; Berridge and Robinson 1998; Cardinal
and Everitt 2004; Schultz 2013). Indeed, the decrease in startle am-
plitude supported by a reward-associated cue (Schmid et al. 1995)
can be blocked by lesions of the nucleus accumbens (Koch et al.
1996).
To test for a role of the nucleus accumbens in relief-memory,
cannulas aiming at the respective region were chronically and bi-
laterally implanted. After recovering from surgery, the animals
underwent the relief-learning procedure, without any injections.
One day later, muscimol was injected to acutely inactivate the
nucleus accumbens, and the ability of the learned cue to modulate
the startle response was tested. It turned out that under such
accumbal inactivation the learned cue does not support startle
attenuation beyond baseline (see Fig. 7). In contrast, silenc-
ing the nucleus accumbens did not prevent startle potentiation
after punishment-learning. In turn, performance after punish-
ment-learning was abolished by silencing the lateral/basolateral
amygdala, a procedure which leaves the performance after re-
lief-learning unaffected. Thus, there is a double dissociation be-
tween the requirement of the nucleus accumbens and lateral/
basolateral amygdala for memory after relief-learning or after pun-
ishment-learning, respectively (Andreatta et al. 2012). Notably,
the “signature” of relief-memory thus corresponds to reward-
memory.
It is important to note that the above experiment specifically
tested for effects on the expression of memory, not for effects on
the acquisition process. Thus, the reviewed findings raise the
question of the role of the nucleus accumbens during training,
i.e., during the acquisition of relief-memory, as well as of the
task-relevant pathways from the nucleus accumbens onto the
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startle pathway, potentially including the ventral pallidum and/
or the pedunculopontine tegmental nucleus (Koch 1999). A per-
haps more immediate question was whether similar neuronal
dissociations of punishment- and relief-memory with regard to
amygdala and nucleus accumbens are found in humans as well.
Humans
Punishment- and reward-learning
In humans too, punishment-learning is most frequently studied
in Pavlovian differential conditioning paradigms: For example, a
geometrical shape such as a square is presented prior to a mild
electric shock (individually calibrated to be mildly painful), while
another stimulus, e.g., a triangle, has no such consequence. After
several trials of training, punishment-memory can be observed on
physiological, behavioral, and verbal levels (see below). Reward-
learning is studied less frequently in humans because sufficiently
strong primary rewards are not easily implemented. What has
been employed are pleasant odors (e.g., Hermann et al. 2000;
Gottfried et al. 2002), pleasant tastants (e.g., O’Doherty et al.
2003), drugs activating primary-reward circuitry (e.g., Winkler
et al. 2011), money as a secondary reward (e.g., Knutson et al.
2001; Kirsch et al. 2003), or points worth money as a tertiary re-
ward (e.g., Kahnt et al. 2012).
In humans, as in rats, measures of both physiological param-
eters (e.g., heart rate, skin conductance response) and of overt
behavior (e.g., startle modulation) are used to assess the effects
of punishment-learning. Sweating determined as an increase
in the skin conductance response is the most frequently used
physiological measure: Punishment-associated stimuli trigger
enhanced skin conductance responses which increase with the
aversiveness of the expected punishment (e.g., Wolter and
Lachnit 1993). Important in the current context, however, is
that reward-associated stimuli can trigger increases in skin con-
ductance too (e.g., Amrhein et al. 2004; Winkler et al. 2011).
Thus, the skin conductance response is a measure of arousal rather
than of conditioned valence (see Lang et al. 2000). In humans as
well, to specifically measure conditioned valence after punish-
ment-learning, modulations of the startle reflex can be used (see
Lang et al. 1990, 2000; Grillon and Baas 2003; Glotzbach-Schoon
et al. 2013). Studies of human startle refer to the very rapid whole-
body syndrome of postural changes (Fig. 8) as well as the closure
of the eyes and accompanying changes in facial expression first de-
scribed upon shooting a pistol (Strauss 1929; Landis and Hunt
1939) (these early works use the German word “Zusammen-
schrecken”). Indeed, Woodworth and Schlossberg (1956) sug-
gested that “the most [. . .] convenient stimulus seems to be
shooting a 22-caliber blank cartridge.” Contemporary experimen-
tal settings instead prefer a short white noise with a sudden onset
(e.g., 95–105 dB, 50 msec) presented via headphones. It was recog-
nized earlyon (Landis andHunt 1939) that the most reliableway to
quantify startle is to focus on the eye closure component by means
of the electromyogram of the musculus orbicularis oculi (Fig.
8; Blumenthal et al. 2005). Alternative ways of eliciting startle
responses in humans are via cutaneous (i.e., mechanical stimu-
lation to the forehead by a tap, air-puff, or mild electric shock) or
visual stimulation (Blumenthal et al. 2005), while alternatives
to measuring eye-blink by electromyograms are to use photoelec-
tric or potentiometric measures (Berg and Balaban 1999; Dawson
et al. 1999). In addition, startle entails postural (see above), auto-
nomic (e.g., Hamm et al. 2003a), and electrocortical (e.g., Schupp
et al. 1997) responses serving to make the subject ready for an im-
minent fight-or-flight situation, as well as modulations of the post-
auricular reflex (e.g., Benning et al. 2004; Franklin et al. 2013a)
(note that the latter can reveal positive valence by increased ampli-
tude). In humans, as in rats, the amplitude of the startle response is
increased in the presence of a shock-associated or an aversive stim-
ulus (Lang et al. 1990; Grillon and Baas 2003; Andreatta et al. 2010;
Norrholm et al. 2011). In turn and important in the current con-
text, numerous studies have revealed that startle is decreased by
stimuli associated with reward or pleasure (e.g., Geier et al. 2000;
Skolnick and Davidson 2002; Conzelmann et al. 2009), although
there is a lack of pure reward-conditioning studies with the startle
response as a dependent measure. The only such study we are
aware of used a visual cue and a monetary reward in a reaction
time task but failed to find an effect of the trained cue on startle re-
sponses (Lipp et al. 1994). In any event, in humans too the startle
response is a bivalent measure: Its potentiation or attenuation can
indicate negative or positive conditioned valence, respectively.
In addition to what is possible in rats (and flies, of course),
humans can be assessed for their explicit, verbal valence of the
conditioned stimulus. This is typically done by asking partici-
pants to rate their feeling toward the conditioned stimulus on
a scale from “emotionally negative” to “emotionally positive.”
After conditioning, compared to before training, humans normal-
ly rate punishment-associated stimuli as more “emotionally neg-
ative” (e.g., Andreatta et al. 2010) and reward-associated stimuli as
more “emotionally positive” (Cox et al. 2005). Obviously, such ex-
plicit measures of valence are possible only in humans as they are
influenced by aspects of human nature that we do not conven-
tionally need to reckon with in rats or flies, such as contingency
awareness and reflectivity (see Hofmann et al. 2010). These top-
down influences and their interaction with bottom-up processes
are captured by dual process theories (e.g., Strack and Deutsch
2004) proposing that human behavior is the result of the integrat-
ed operation of impulsive and reflective processing. The reflective
system organizes behavior intentionally, that is via decision pro-
cesses based on knowledge about the value and the probability
of behavioral consequences, while the impulsive system operates
largely independently of a person’s intention or goal. Even so, the
impulsive system is thought to generate experiential corollaries,
yet these are much less nuanced as compared to the reflective sys-
tem. Normally, impulsive and reflective processes are well inte-
grated and concordant and jointly organize behavior: Within
dual-process theories, the increase or decrease in startle amplitude
after punishment- or reward-learning reflects impulsive valua-
tion, while the ratings of the conditioned stimuli track a concor-
dant reflective process. However, as the discussion below will
show, under some conditions one has to reckon with discordance
among these systems.
The neuronal substrates of punishment-learning and startle
potentiation are strikingly similar in man, monkey, and rat, argu-
ably because the underlying circuitry and its modulation are evo-
lutionarily ancient and conserved (see Lang et al. 2000; Davis
et al. 2008, 2009). Functional magnetic resonance imaging has
confirmed amygdala activity triggered by punishment-associated
stimuli as compared to neutral stimuli (e.g., Bu¨chel et al. 1998;
LaBar et al. 1998), even if subjects were not aware of stimulus pre-
sentation due to masking (Morris et al. 1998). In addition, insula
and anterior cingulate cortex were found by most studies to be in-
volved in punishment-learning (for review, see Sehlmeyer et al.
2009). The necessity of the amygdala for punishment-learning
in humans is also confirmed by studies examining patients with
specific lesions. The seminal study of Bechara et al. (1995) revealed
a double dissociation by showing that a patient with bilateral
amygdala lesions did not acquire conditioned autonomic fear
responses but had declarative knowledge of contingencies, while
a patient with bilateral hippocampus lesions failed to learn con-
tingencies but did acquire conditioning. Further studies with
amygdala-lesioned patients revealed that these patients do not
show startle potentiation either in response to punishment itself
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(Angrilli et al. 1996) or to punishment-associated stimuli, even if
they acquire declarative knowledge of contingencies (Weike et al.
2005). In turn, punishment-associated stimuli can cause an in-
crease in startle in subjects with intact amygdalae yet unaware
of stimulus presentation due to cortical blindness (Hamm et al.
2003b). Thus, startle potentiation, an implicit measure of condi-
tioned valence after punishment-learning, engages and requires
the amygdala, and can take place without contingency awareness
and without concordant explicit valuation.
The neuronal substrates of human reward-learning studied
by functional magnetic resonance imaging include the ventral
striatum (which in humans includes the nucleus accumbens)
and the orbitofrontal cortex: Gottfried et al. (2002) paired three
neutral faces with pleasant, neutral, or unpleasant odors and
found that appetitive olfactory learning led to activity in the me-
dial orbitofrontal cortex and nucleus accumbens as well as in
the amygdala. O’Doherty et al. (2002) examined brain activity
elicited by visual stimuli previously paired with either a pleasant
sweet taste, a moderately aversive low-
salt taste, or no taste. When anticipating
reward, activity in the ventral striatum
and orbitofrontal cortex was found (for
a related finding using monetary reward,
see Kirsch et al. 2003); in addition, activi-
ty in the amygdala was reported under
such conditions. Of these activations,
only orbitofrontal cortex activation, ar-
guably in another region, was seen upon
the actual delivery of reward (for a report
confirming this double role of the orbito-
frontal cortex, using a monetary reward,
see Cox et al. 2005). Perhaps more im-
portant in the current context, the only
regions activated in accordance with
an appetitive prediction error signal,
that is the difference between expected
and received reward, are the ventral stria-
tum and orbitofrontal cortex (O’Doherty
et al. 2003).Thus, althoughstudies on the
necessity of these regions in human
primary-reward learning are lacking (but
see, e.g., Bechara et al. 1999; Tsuchida
et al. 2010) and although the boundary
conditions for the engagement of the
amygdala in particular stillneed to be bet-
ter understood, the underlying circuitry
in man may well turn out to be very
similar to that in the rat in the case of
reward-learning too.
Relief-learning
In order to fully appreciate the mnemon-
ic consequences of an adverse event such
as an electric shock, Andreatta et al.
(2012, 2013) decided to test for relief-
learning in humans as well, using a para-
digm as closely related to the studies in
the rat as possible. Two groups of subjects
underwent discrimination learning of
visual geometrical shapes, one of which
became associated with moderately pain-
ful electric shocks. What differed be-
tween the groups was the relative timing
of the visual stimuli and the shocks
(Fig. 8): Either one visual shape preceded
the shocks (punishment-learning), or it was presented upon the
offset of the shocks (relief-learning). Afterward, the implicit and
explicit valences of the stimuli were measured by their capacity
to modulate the startle response and by ratings, respectively. It
turned out (Fig. 8) that if associated with shock onset, the visual
stimulus subsequently potentiated startle, indicating negative
conditioned valence; in turn, if associated with pain offset, the vi-
sual stimulus subsequently attenuated startle, indicating positive
conditioned valence.
Interestingly, although in Andreatta et al. (2010) the subjects
showed potentiated startle after punishment-learning (negative
valence) and attenuated startle after relief-learning (positive va-
lence), and although these implicit measures of conditioned
valence match the findings in rat and fly, it then turned out
that, irrespective of whether the visual stimulus had been used
in punishment- or in relief-learning, the subjects explicitly rated
them as “emotionally negative” (but see Zanna et al. 1970).
Such a discordance between implicit and explicit conditioned
Figure 8. (Legend on next page)
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valence led to the question whether in humans the cortical “foot-
print” of the learned visual stimulus would be punishment-
like or reward-like, and would thus correspond to explicit or
implicit valence judgments. It was found (Fig. 8) that after punish-
ment-learning the learned stimulus activated the amygdala as
part of a conditioned fear network; in contrast, after relief-learn-
ing it activated the striatum, i.e., part of a reward network
(Andreatta et al. 2012). Thus, in the case of punishment-learning
there was a concordance between neural activation, implicit va-
lence, and explicit valence of the learned stimulus. In contrast, af-
ter relief-learning the negative explicit valence of the learned
stimulus appeared discordant with its reward-like neuronal signa-
ture and its positive implicit valence. Notably, after both punish-
ment- and relief-learning an activation of the insula was found
(Andreatta et al. 2012). Given that humans explicitly judged
both punishment- and relief-conditioned cues as emotionally
negative in that study, it is tempting to speculate that the insula
is involved in the generation of emotional valence experience
(see also Craig 2009) and/or in the experience of excitement inde-
pendent of valence (Elliott et al. 2000). Recently, a follow-up study
(Andreatta et al. 2013) suggested that both the nature of the task
as a between- versus a within-subject task and the predictability of
the shock modify explicit valence in relief-learning: In a newly
introduced within-subjects design, both implicit and explicit va-
lence measures after relief-learning were positive if shock occur-
rence was predictable. These findings call for a full clarification
of the experimental boundary conditions, causes, and psychiatric
implications of the observed dissociation between explicit and
implicit valence of stimuli associated with relief.
We note that previous studies, although related, used ap-
proaches critically different from the relief-learning approach
which is the focus of the present review (see also the discussions
in Riebe et al. 2012; Kong et al. 2013): Seymour et al. (2005) exam-
ined brain responses triggered by stimuli predicting a reduction of
tonic pain, Leknes et al. (2011) used a procedure involving the
omission of a painful stimulus, and Kim et al. (2006) as well as
Levita et al. (2012) studied brain responses during instrumental
avoidance of an aversive outcome. Interestingly, reward centers
of the brain, i.e., ventral striatum and orbitofrontal cortex, seem
to be implicated in all these cases (see also the discussion of the
role of these activations in active avoidance learning in Ilango
et al. 2012). To study the unconditioned implicit valence of
pain offset itself, Franklin et al. (2013a) presented the startle noise
immediately after a painful stimulus and measured both the eye-
blink and the post-auricular component of the startle response.
Startle eye blink was reduced and startle post-auricular reactivity
enhanced, arguing not only for a reduction in negative affect
but for a genuinely positive affective component several seconds
after pain offset. Lastly, Fujiwara et al. (2009) implemented relief
in a very different, arguably higher-order sense: Subjects were in-
formed post hoc whether their actual choice had yielded them a
better (“relief”) or worse (“regret”) monetary feedback than if
they had made an alternative choice. Under thus-defined relief
conditions, activity in anterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex
was observed; notably, this held true for relief cases implemented
by means of both more gain and less loss.
In any event, on the basis of the reviewed findings, we pro-
pose as a working hypothesis that pain offset activates at least
parts of the accumbal reward circuitry and that these activations
induce relief-learning. The learned cue is thus endowed with the
capacity to trigger conditioned relief, which is entangled with
the activity of much of that same circuitry. Consistent with this
working hypothesis, firing of dopaminergic neurons as well as
the hemodynamic activity of their target regions, such as the ven-
tral striatum, can be increased not only by reward (for review, see
Schultz 2013) but also by the reduction (Seymour et al. 2005) or
upon the termination (Becerra and Borsook 2008; Brischoux
et al. 2009; Fiorillo et al. 2013a,b) of an adverse event. Such off-
set-activation is particularly obvious when the end of the adverse
event is indeed clearly defined in time, as is the case for air puff but
arguably not for taste cues such as salty
and in particular bitter (Fiorillo et al.
2013b, loc. cit. Fig. 2A). Whether the
omission of punishment activates these
neurons as well is a matter of controversy
(e.g., Leknes et al. 2011; Fiorillo 2013;
Fiorillo et al. 2013a,b).
Our working hypothesis must not
be construed as equating relief with re-
ward (indeed in flies at least considerable
discrepancies are observed: see section
“Fly”); rather, we argue that some of the
neuronal footprint is shared between re-
lief and reward, prompting the question
how far these commonalities extend,
both in the neuronal and in the psycho-
logical domain—and how the differences
between relief and reward are neuronally
and psychologically structured.
Relevance for defensive behavior:
extending the threat-imminence
model to post-strike
Faculties such as punishment-learning
have evolved because of their benefits
to survival, but of course there are few
electric shocks in nature—except per-
haps lightning or the defense systems
of electric fish. Of greater concern are, for
example, predators, parasites, “armed”
Figure 8. (A) Body posture upon a pistol shot illustrating the startle response pattern (from Landis
and Hunt 1939) initially described as “Zusammenschrecken” by Strauss (1929). Together with the im-
mediate, brief concomitant closure of the eyes, startle serves to protect from imminent threat and to
prepare the subject for fight-or-flight behavior. (B) Magnetic resonance image of a human brain,
coronal slice. (C) Experimental setup for relief- and punishment-learning in humans. The subject
faces a computer monitor (not shown) on which visual stimuli can be displayed. During training
mild electric shock punishment can be delivered to the left forearm. During the test, a loud noise
can be delivered through the earphones to induce the startle response while the subjects watch the
screen on which visual stimuli are displayed. Measurement electrodes (blue) record the eye-closure
component of the startle response via electromyography (EMG) from the musculus orbicularis oculi.
(D) Sketch of the sequence of events for relief- or punishment-learning, using a between-group
design. During training, in both groups a control stimulus (e.g., a triangle) is presented temporally
removed from shock. In the relief-learning group, a second geometrical stimulus (e.g., a circle) is pre-
sented upon cessation of shock (ISI ¼ 6 sec). During the test the startle amplitude, evoked by a loud
noise from the earphones and measured by the eye-EMG, is less when subjects are viewing the relief-
trained than when viewing the control stimulus. In contrast, in the punishment-learning group the
second stimulus (e.g., a square) is presented before shock (ISI ¼ 28 sec). During the test the startle am-
plitude is higher when subjects are viewing the punishment-trained than when viewing the control
stimulus. Note that the experimental role of the geometrical shapes is counterbalanced across subjects.
(E) Experimental data showing relief- or punishment-memory, dependent on the relative timing of the
visual stimulus and shock during training. As in Figure 6, positive conditioned valence (“Good”) is
plotted toward the top of the y-axis indicating the degree of startle attenuation; in turn, startle poten-
tiation is plotted toward the bottom of the y-axis in order to display negative conditioned valence
(“Bad”) toward the bottom. The sign of the startle modulation is presented as, respectively, negative
or positive, because the actual behavior of the subjects consists of less or more startle, respectively.
Box plots show the median as the bold middle line, and the 25%/75% and 10%/90% quantiles as
box boundaries and whiskers, respectively. Data taken from Andreatta et al. 2010, sample sizes are
N ¼ 34 and N ¼ 33 for the punishment- and the relief-learning groups, respectively. (F) After
punishment-learning, the learned visual stimulus induces activation of the right amygdala (left
panel), but not of the striatum. In contrast, a relief-conditioned visual stimulus induces activation of
the right striatum (right panel), but not of the amygdala; striatum activation extends to the ventral stri-
atum/nucleus accumbens. Both the punishment- and the relief-conditioned stimulus induce activation
of the left insula as well (not shown). From Andreatta et al. (2012), sample sizes are N ¼ 14 for both the
punishment- and the relief-learning groups.
Pain-relief learning
www.learnmem.org 246 Learning & Memory
 Cold Spring Harbor Laboratory Press on March 16, 2015 - Published by learnmem.cshlp.orgDownloaded from 
insects, such as mosquitos, ants, or bees, competitors, physical
events such as forest fires, as well as irritant, toxic, or, in the
case of flies, even predatory plants. In each case, it is adaptive to
learn the cues predictive of the threat in order to gain time for de-
ciding on the most appropriate action and/or bodily preparing for
it. Such coping behavior includes risk assessment, avoidance/
flight, and approach/fight. Indeed, according to the threat-
imminence model (Fanselow 1994), defensive behavior in rats—
and arguably in humans as well (see, e.g., Lo¨w et al. 2008)—is or-
ganized in three stages, depending on the temporal and spatial
proximity of threat (see also Blanchard and Blanchard 1989):
pre-encounter, post-encounter, and strike phase. If the sub-
ject registers an increased likelihood of threat in the pre-
encounter phase, this results in increased general alertness, undi-
rected search behavior, orienting, and risk assessment; this phase
in humans is entangled with feelings of anxiety. The post-
encounter phase is characterized by freezing, reflex potentiation
including startle, and selective attention to the encountered
threat (interestingly, the silence that ensues upon the cessation
of movement during freezing may, in turn, be a signal for threat
to conspecifics [Pereira et al. 2012], in particular in combination
with ultrasonic distress vocalizations emitted into this silence
[Wo¨hr and Schwarting 2013]). The strike phase is associated
with directed fight/flight behavior; in humans both the post-
encounter and strike phase are characterized by the emotion of
fear. While it is unknown which brain structures mediate the
pre-encounter phase, the amygdala and the ventral periaqueduc-
tal gray are critical for the post-encounter phase, and the dorsal
periaqueductal gray as well as the superior colliculus are impor-
tant for the strike period. On the basis of the reviewed data, this
three-stage model should be extended (see also the insightful ac-
count of behavior organization put forth by Craig 1918) to in-
clude a post-strike phase characterized by the emotion of relief,
behaviorally expressed as startle attenuation and mediated by
the nucleus accumbens. The positive valence of this phase is bio-
logically reasonable because it can reinforce those behaviors
that helped to escape or otherwise master and survive the threat
(Smith and Buchanan 1954; Ilango et al. 2012) and the learning
of the cues associated with its disappearance: Subsequently,
learned approach behavior to such cues would decrease the prob-
ability of encountering the threat again. Such an extension of the
threat-imminence model should provide an integrated, conceptu-
ally, and biologically meaningful framework for both punish-
ment- and relief-learning in rats and humans. Furthermore, it
should prompt Drosophila researchers to characterize the defen-
sive behaviors of flies toward threats as well as toward shock-
predicting stimuli in more detail than has been customary to
date (for a pioneering analysis, see Chabaud et al. 2010). This
should reveal whether invertebrate defensive behavior follows
the same general principles. Indeed, using terminology that
may appear old fashioned today, the early neuroethologists
around Craig, von Holst, Tinbergen, von Frisch, and Lorenz
were applying a hierarchical and sequential framework of behav-
ior organization featuring the steps of (1) need-related, spatially
undirected search behavior and attention, (2) spatially directed
orientation behavior and attention, and (3) eventual action and
the embodiment of consequences (Craig 1918; Lorenz and
Tinbergen 1938; Bullock and Horridge 1965; Lorenz 1973).
Perspectives for applied psychology
The reviewed data suggest that considering relief-learning can also
help us to understand some features of odd and/or pathological
behavior. For example, “having survived” a roller-coaster ride or
extreme sports may support relief-learning by activating reward
circuitry, reinforce these activities, give the situation an implicit
positive valence, and thus explain an otherwise irrational ten-
dency to perform such dangerous activities again (Solomon and
Corbit 1974). Likewise, self-cutting and related nonsuicidal self-
injury maybe operant behaviors carried out in order to access relief
(Franklin et al. 2013a,b). Moreover, the relief experienced by a
hostage following acute repeated death threats may help explain
the development of positive feelings toward the hostage taker
(“Stockholm syndrome”). Relief-learning may also contribute
to the attraction of anxiety patients to cues associated with fear off-
set such as medication, or the hospital or therapy environment,
and may explain why items not plausibly causally related to but
temporally linked with fear offset can become fear-fighting talis-
mans. Similar scenarios may apply regarding the offset of traumat-
ic events or of panic attacks and the safety-seeking behavior that
mayemerge. Further, hypervigilance to signals of upcoming threat
(Bishop 2007) together with a deficit in the perception of (or defi-
cits in learning about) offset signalsmay turn a bad experience into
an unbearable one (see also Box 2), and thus contribute to the sus-
ceptibility for post-traumatic stress or panic disorder (Mineka and
Oehlberg 2008; Jovanovic et al. 2012). For example, patients suf-
fering from post-traumatic stress disorder not only express en-
hanced fear-learning but also a reduced response to safety signals
(Jovanovic et al. 2012). Furthermore, successful safety-seeking
behavior may contribute to the maintenance of anxiety disorders
such as panic disorders or agoraphobia (Lohr et al. 2007). We note
that inflies at least (andpreliminary data suggest that it is similar in
rats) memories after relief-learning are temporally more stable
than memories after punishment-learning relatively early (up to
2 h) after conditioning (Yarali et al. 2008; Diegelmann et al.
2013b). If this were the case in humans, too, deficiencies in
relief-learning might render subjects more susceptible in particu-
lar to repeated adverse experiences occurring in relatively quick
succession, such that the net effect of a sequence of grave experi-
ences is turned into an unbearable, traumatic one.
To summarize, relief-learning can be observed in species as
distantly related as flies, rats, and man. This draws attention to
the mnemonic processes related to the offset of reinforcers; in-
deed, these processes may prove to be no less universally con-
served than those related to reinforcement onset (Rescorla 1988)
and thus lend themselves to translational research. Specifically,
we believe that the full range of the behavioral and psychologi-
cal consequences of painful and/or traumatic experiences cannot
be appreciated without taking relief-learning into account. As
we argue, relief-learning should be considered in particular
when trying to understand the development and maintenance
of both adaptive avoidance behavior and of pathological condi-
tions such as exaggerated risk-taking, self-injury, excessive safety-
seeking, post-traumatic stress disorder as well as panic disorders.
In all these cases, attention in particular seems warranted as to
whether or not modifications of these behaviors or the considered
therapy are differentially effective for fear- and relief-memories.
To this end, basic and translational research into the cellular, mo-
lecular, and genetic bases for punishment- and relief-learning is
both useful and fascinating.
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